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自 La Porta 等人发现控股股东以及控制权与现金流权的分离现象以来，大股东
和中小股东之间的代理问题引起了公司治理研究者们的高度重视。本文把研究焦点
集中在控制权与现金流权的分离现象对公司战略决策（如 R&D 投入）的影响上，






R&D 投入的假设，即 R&D 投入强度与企业价值正相关；然而，控制权与现金流权




















Since La Porta et al. (1999) found the ubiquitous phenomenon of controlling owners 
and the separation of control and ownership around countries in the world except US and 
UK, researchers in the area of corporate governance started to pay more and more 
attention to the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
This paper focused on the effect of the separation between ownership and control on 
firm’s strategic decisions such as R&D investments. Based on La Porta et al. (1999), this 
paper investigated the effects of controlling ownership and the separation of control and 
ownership on firms’ R&D investments and the efficiency of R&D investments, and 
comes up with corresponding predictions. Using the data of Korean manufacturing 
industry from 1995-2007, and exploiting fixed-effect model and Arellano-Bond dynamic 
panel model, this paper found: (1) the separation of control and ownership has negative 
effect on R&D intensity, further analysis indicates that the separation of control and 
ownership negatively moderates the relationship between controlling ownership and 
R&D intensity; (2) the separation of control and ownership doesn’t have negative effect 
on the efficiency of R&D investments. What’s more, this paper verified the conventional 
wisdom about R&D investments, namely R&D intensity positively associates with firm 
value; but the separation of control and ownership reduces the positive effect of R&D 
projects. 
This paper contributes the literature firstly by providing the new evidence that 
controlling owners have incentive to expropriate from minority shareholders, secondly by 
discovering that the separation of control and ownership leads to the lower level of R&D 
investments, which further reduces firms’ innovativeness and core ability. According to 
above conclusions, I gave out suggestions as follows: improving the corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate governance environment of firms in emerging 
markets can not only enhance firms’ innovativeness, but also firms’ value, which would 
further improve countries’ innovativeness and comprehensive national strength. 
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Anglo-American  model）不足以刻画所有国家的公司治理情况（La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998） [2, 3] ，因为世界上大多数国家的公司并未真正实现了所有权和经营权的分离。
La Porta et al. (1999) [4] 、Claessons et al. (2000) [5] 、Faccio et al. (2002) [6] 都发现了
控股股东 1 （controlling owner）的存在，并且他们通过金字塔股权结构（pyramidal 
structure）、交叉持股（cross-holding）等手段来实现控制权（controlling rights）与
现金流权（cash flow rights）分离 2 的现象十分普遍。在这些企业中，控股股东把
持着公司高级管理层和董事会的重要职位。因此，对于这些公司，控股股东们在扮
演管理者的同时也是所有者，他们对企业战略决策的制定如 R&D 投入经费、分红
政策都起着决定性的作用。基于以上发现，La Porta et al. (1999) [4] 提出了终极产权
理论，之后的大量有关控股股东的研究几乎都是基于该理论来分析的。比如
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观层面来讲，经济学家们早已把 R&D 投入当作经济增长的推动力（Romer, 1990）
[14]。从微观层面来讲，R&D 投入是企业创造核心竞争力和提高企业价值的主要驱
动力（Franko, 1989; Hall, 1998）[15, 16]。尽管 R&D 投入经费的多少对公司业绩和盈
利能力有着如此重大的影响，但是即便是在同一个行业里，每个企业在 R&D 投入
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